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ABSTRACT

Effect of Land in Commons on the DecisionMaking Behavior of the Pastoralists in
the Central Rangelands of Somalia

by

Abdinasir Mohamed Abdulle, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State University, 2000

Major Professor: Dr. Kenneth S. Lyon
Department : Economics

Degradation of the rangelands is very common around the permanent settlements
of the central range lands of Somalia. This degradation is attributed to overstocking
resulting from the fact that the rangelands are communally owned and herders are ignoring
th e shadow value of the forage. Information about the optimal herd size would help halt
the rangeland degradati on.
In tillS study. two allocation mechanisms were compared. The first was the private
own~ rs hip

S(>i uth>n

"h~rc

someo ne owns the rangeland and decides how many animals

shou ld be gra; e·d the-re . The second was the solution where the range land is owned in
comm on b~ the· U\1 dlcrs of the area and access to it is free and unrestricted. For the pri vate
ownership, a moJd " ·as deve loped that solves the economically optimal herd size and
forage stock.

Th~

model also determines the optimal milk production and sales and li ve-

cattle sa les and s laughters during the transition period and at the stationary state. For the

Ill

communal ownership, the set of the first-order conditions of the model were solved
simultaneously after the shadow value of the forage was dropped.
A computer program of the optimization algorithm, GAMSIMINOS , was used to
so lve both problems using data from the central rangelands of Somalia. GAMSIMINOS
provided the optimal values of all of the state, costate, and control variables during the
transition period and at the stationary state.
(95 pages)
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Livestock is seen in Somalia as gaining in importance as a fonn of economic
development, either as an earner of foreign exchange to finance diversification into other
sectors or as a provider of part of the population's basic need of food. The relative
importance of the livestock industry of Somalia in the national economy is greater than any
other country in Africa (Ghouse (1983]). It accounts for 50% of the gross domestic product
and for over 80% of the export earnings. This sector also provides about 40% of the
nation al food supply. The production ofanirnals to meet the demands of both exports and
local consumption comes entirely from the nomadic and seminomadic sector of the
commu nity. Th is sector of the economy represents nearly 70% of the population (Ghouse
[ 1983]).
The central regions of Somalia are si tuated within arid and semiarid zones and receive
around 200-300 mm of rainfall annually. The rainfall in these areas is characterized by
scarcity, poor distribution, and year-to-year wet season initiation variability.

The

vegetation density of these arid and semiarid rangelands is low, and variations in forage
supp ly and quality are high . These great fluctu ations, together with periodic lack of
drinking water for livestock , have led to the nomadic and seminomadic modes of li fe for
the pastoralists of the central regions of Somalia.
The central rangelands of Somalia are menaced by the process of environmental
degradation called desertification .

Desertification is a deteriorating transition from

semiarid to desert ecosystems with a concomitant reduction in biological producti vity. Le
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Hou ero u [ 1975] considers the problem to be an encroachment of desert landscapes into
areas that clirnaticall y should not be desert.
It is commonly agreed that the basic cause of desertification is man 's disruption of the

ot herwise balanced ecosystem , which is intensi fied by naturally occurring, periodic
drou ght s (Delwaulle [ 1977]; Eckho lm and Brown [ 1977]; Le Houerou [ 1977]; Kansas
[ 1970]; Ware [ 1977)). The principal disruptive effect man has on the land's resources is
a systematic devegetation of the landscape. This results in a replacement of the stabl e
perenn ial vegetation by the more transient annual vegetation, a decrease in litter and soil
organic mauer, an increase in soi l eros ion, and a more xeric, less productive ecosystem.
The central rangelands of So malia are communally owned. The commons framework
has been described by Hardin and Baden [ 1977] and Foxall [ 1979] in terms of the
inevitability of the depleti on of natural resources with an expanding population and an
unrestricted access to their use.

In such a context, the positi ve utility gained by an

individual from an incremental use of the resource is greater than the negati ve utility
imposed on each user since the deleterious consequences of overuse are widely shared.
The private individual or fami lial ownership of milk, offspring, and stock enables the
individua l or fami ly to derive personal benefits from the land. This leads to a strategy of
choi ce based on net surplu s maximization, whereby the future of the commons is
disco unted at a very high rate. There is an opportunistic use of the land by overgrazing and
no incentive to reduce stock numbers.
Herd si zes are increasing due to a natural tendency on the part of the pastoralists to
increase their herd size whenever possible as wealth and prestige are measured in terms of
herd si ze and not the condition of the herd. T hi s means that, since the herder grazing his
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animals in a communally owned rangeland that is not regulated fai Is to recognize the
marginal social cost of th e forage, the marginal private benefit of grazing an extra animal
outweighs the marginal social cost of grazing an extra animal, leading to an increase in herd
size beyond the optimal level.
Improvements in veteri nary services and water developments have helped make it
possible for the pastoralist to increase his/her herd size by minimizing the natural control
on numbers previously caused by disease and scarcity of water. This trend of increasing
herd si zes beyond the carrying capacity resulted in widespread overgrazing and range
retrogression in the central rangelands of Somalia.
Information about the optimal long-term range management could help halt the
rangel and degradation so that the pastoralists could reap the benefits from the rangelands
for a longer time period. It was the need to acquire such information that motivated this
study.
Th e purpose of thi s st udy is to detem1ine the difference in the optimal herd size
between rangelands with un regulated private exploitation (scenario I) and rangelands with
uni tied contro l (scenario 2). With unregulated private exploitation, the herder ignores the
co ll ecti ve effect of grazin g on forage avai lability and sets the marginal social opportunity
cost equal to social average product. But, with unified control the collective effect of
grazi ng on forage avai labi lity in the future is taken into account so he sets the margina l
facto r costs eq ual to value of marginal product.

To meet this objective, this study

deve loped and implemented a discrete time op timal control model.
For each scenario, th e implementation of the model identifies the following :
I)

The optimal tim e profile of the herd size and therefore of female and male stock.
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2)

The optimal time path of the forage stock.

3)

The time profile for all of the control variables, namely, females and males sold
and slaughtered for household consumption.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter provides the background and motivation for this study by reviewing the
ex istin g literature on the competing frameworks for the economic interpretation of the
pastoralists ' behavior. Hence, this chapter discusses on the competing frameworks for the
eco nomic interpretation of the pastoralists ' behavior.
It has been recogni zed for a long time that the perception gap of the outsiders hindered
the understanding of the pastoral economics (Baker (!981]). Livestock plays many roles
in the tradit ional econom y and society. Outsiders ' lack of appreciation of these roles has
led to polici es that contributed to a shattering of the traditional ecological relationships and
established no economi c and social substitutes that could accommodate the growing
pressure on the tradi tional li vestock production system (Baker [ 1981 ]).
Th e first attempts to develop frameworks for analyzing livestock systems were made
by ant hropologists w ho, beca use o f the structural functional theories in the anthropology
of the 1950s, concentrated on the pastoral va lues and attitudes instead of the econom ic
aspects (Sch nei der [ 198 1] ; Baker (198 1] ; Dahl [ 1981] ; Grandin [ 1980]). By the 1960s, the
Malinowski an influences, which attributed all social behaviors to economic causes, reduced
the limitati ons in the structural analyses of social anthropo logy. However, the resulting
econom ic in terpretations were limited by their poor handling of temporal and spatial
diffe rences among societies. Furthem10re, the economic explanation of overstocking and
the general low supply o f li vestock by the traditional producers led to the prevalent idea of
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an economic irrationality and backward-bending supply curves of effort and output in the
Afi-ican pastoral societies.

Prestige Maximization

Prestige maximization, the theory that Herskovits [ 1926) developed, states that
livestock is possessed and esteemed merely for the prestige its possession brings, hence,
it is an idle asset that has no economic role in African pastoral societies. Consequently, the
pastoral ist seeks to maximi ze his herd size and thereby his prestige. Herskovits maintains
that th e pastoralist manages his/her herd according to economic and climatic signals or,
even, consumption needs.

The Repository of Value Framework

The repository of val ue framework was first proposed by Schneider [ 1984). ln this
frame work , Schneider emphasizes the role of livestock as a medium of exchange. Usi ng
Einzig 's [ 1949) concept of primitive money, Schneider [ 1981) shows how livestock fulfills
the three most rel evant functions of money: medium of exchange, store of value, and unit
of account. Also, the high demand for livestock often makes it the medium through which
all other goods are traded . Co nsequently, Schneider c laims that African pastoralists seek
large herds to increase their money supply. Cows are valued more than bulls as they
prod uce more livestock nncl, thus, more money.
From these premises, Schneider [1984) critiques the cattle complex hypothesis in its
consideration of cattle as th e sole expression of wealth for East African herders but not as
mon ey. ln effec t, besides a competing use for subsistence, cattle have financial functions,
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are repositories of value, and should be taken as money in pastoral societies. The monetary
ro le is also emphas ized by Crotty [ 1980], Shapiro [ 1979], and Konczacki [ 1978].
From the monetary role of livestock, Schneider theorizes on a political economy of
pastoralism, whereby pastoral capitalism (Schneider [1981]) explains the relations of
production and the distribution or acquisition of power. In this framework, pastoralists are
constantly involved in in vestment decisions.

They manage a pastoral capital for

subsistence and make reinvestment decisions and capital gains from sales (Schneider
(1981 ]). This is, however, done in tem1s of inferior or primitive money. Therefore, a shift
to beef production, where catt le becomes a simple commodity, corresponds to a radical
revo lution in the rationality of the cattle owner for whom the animal is not comparab le to
the modem and superior fom1s ofmoney (Schneider [ 198 1]).
Shapi ro [ 1979]. in describing the role of livestock in West African pastoral societies,
gi ves a more balanced approach by referring both to cultural maintenance and social
relati onships and to production and exchange. ln these societies, livestock contributes to
subsistence ami crop production and provides financial services by acting as an investment
good th at is easi ly conYertible to cash, is a portable medium of exchange, and offers options
for decreasing ri ;k through dispersion of herds or building large herds.

Security Maximization

Th e ec un t' ma,irnJLation approach says that the main characteristics of the pastoral
prod uction

s ~ >t<:ln

arc dctcnnined by strategies for security, particularly adequate food

production l "" >e-cun t' brings the prestige and status afforded to cattle owners in African
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pastoral societies.

The main strategies cited are mobility, herd diversification and

dispersion , and herd size maximization.
According to this perspective, herders are risk-averse and are preoccupied with their
Jon g-tem1, economic security, given the unstable ecosystem. Consequently,large herds are
valued because they provide direct insurance for consumption needs, as many males offer
a hedge against future cash needs, and many females ensure milk supply in bad years and
sa feguard herd reconstruction after a drought or disease epidemic. Large herds also provide
a social insurance network that can be called upon in periods of difficulty and pem1it the
pastorali st to provide hi s chi ldren with a core herd and, thereby, ensure the continuity of
his famil y and hi s retirement.
However, the milk and meat productions of even large herds are often insufficient to
sati sfy the pastoralist' s consumption needs. Consequently, this approach argues that the
herd er sells, or baners, li vestock and li vestock products in exchange for grai n and other
fo od it ems. Whenever possible, the herder prefers to sell or baner milk and milk products,
since thi s conserves his/her capital stock. As a resu lt, livestock is only so ld to satisfy
speci fi c major needs and not for profit considerations.

Profit Maximization

Jarvis [ 1974) developed a model that is based on the neoclassical economic theory of
profit maximi zation to analyze the semi-intensive ranching system in Argentina. He later
ex tend ed it to evaluate the pastoral production system of Swaziland.

The model

incorporates many of the socioeconomic characteri stics of pastoral production systems
discussed above .
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Jarvis [ 1981 Jmaintains that livestock is valued because it: is a productive asset; turns
forage into beef; is certain cash (milk, traction, blood); and has noncash flow benefits (store
of value, prestige, status, securi ty, etc.) . Accordingly, Jarvis maintains that livestock
producers seek to maximize profits. To maximize profits the producer must determine the
optimal sale age for his livestock, based on the current and expected prices of livestock,
cash flow benefits and inputs , as well as the current and expected rates of weight gain and
interest.
Jarvis and Ariza-Nino and Shapiro [1984) made several changes in the above model
to adapt it to African production systems. Jarvis asserts that the negative supply response
is short run . As the period of observation grows longer and the herder has time to increase
production, Jarvis argues that livestock supply will respond positively to a price rise.
This model also has implications for the effect of changes in interest rates and
production conditions on the animals' optimum sale age. A rise in interest rates raises the
suppl y as animals are sold at younger ages.

However, the pastoralists in the central

rangeland o f Somalia are insensitive to interest rates because of their weak link with capital
market s.
Store of Wealth

Sapell i [ 1985) developed a two-period model where the producer, confronted with a
capi ta l constrai nt. seek s to maximi ze utility composed of current and future consumption.
Sapell i con siders that because of the capital constraint , the producer is unable to separate
production and consumption decisions. Since the producer cannot borrow, he/she has to
increase current production in order to increase current consumption. Consequently,
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Sapelli argues that the producers make production decisions that maximize consumption
and not profits, as in Jarvis's model.
Sapelli showed that producers have a positive supply response when future prices are
ex pected to rise, an d a negative supply response to an increase in current prices. Sapelli
draws upon the classical life cycle consumption model to explain these results. This model
stresses the herder's desire for a constant stream of consumption over time and his tendency
to save during periods of high income and to dissave during periods of low income.
Consequently, to stabilize their consumption and maximize their utility, producers seek to
equa li ze th eir intertemporal marginal utilities of income.

As a resu lt, they sell their

li vestock assets when current prices are low, in order to keep consumption at the permanent
level, and save them when current prices are high . Likewise, when future prices are
expected to be high, producers increase current supply, thereby increasing current
consumption and stabili zi ng their marginal utilities of consumption. Thus, by varying their
mar~etable

output inversely with price trends, li vestock producers stabilize their revenues

in a manner similar to fam1 ers (whose price and production trends naturally tend to move
in opposite directions).
Cord-Gu iot [1991] adopted Sapelli's model and incorporated variables to monitor
production conditions. The model predicts that an improvement in the herder' s current
tem1 s of trad e causes his co nsumption to increase. The rise in the herder 's relative price
rat io causes him to subs titute future for current consumption and raises his real wealth,
enco uraging hi gher consumption levels. The model also predicts that an improvement in
production conditions has an ambiguous effect on consumption and, hence, the herder's
supp ly response.

Whi le the subsistence effect is negative, as herders increase their
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li vestock investment and take advantage of the increased biomass, the wealth effect is
posit ive, reflecting the increased herd size due to the improved production conditions. The
empirical results of this model suggest that forage is not a significant constraint in nondrought periods and that the effect of forage on herd production is small. Finally, the
model predicts that a decrease in herd size reduces current consumption, as the decrease in
herd size produces a negati ve wealth effect.

The Commons Framework

According to the commons framework, the central issues in pastoral production
systems are the actual land tenure institutions and the derived individual incentives that
shape the resource use decisions (Hopcraft [1981]; Widstrand [1975]). The producer
behav ior is, therefore, not culture bound or determined by a cattle-complex irrationality.
It is a predictable response to two sets of incentives:
I)

An external incenti ve system implied by the trade and economic relations with

other producers and other sectors of the national economy.
2)

A set of intern al management incentives whose interrelationship with the first
exp lains the producer behavior.

The commons framew ork has been described by Hardin and Baden [1977] and Foxall
[ 1979] in tenn s of the inevitability of the depletion of natural resources with an expanding
population and an unrestricted access to their use. In such a context, the positive utility
ga ined by an individual from an incrementa l use of the resource is greater than the negative
utilit y imposed on each other user since the deleterious consequences of overuse are widely
shared.
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In the case of traditional livestock production systems, grazing land is a communally
owned resource. However, the private individual or household ownership of milk,
o ffspring, and stock enables the individual or fam ily to derive personal benefits from the
land . Th is leads to a strategy of choice based on surplus maximization, whereby the future
va lu e of the co mmons is discounted at a very high rate. This results in an opportunistic
use of the land by overgrazing and no incentive to reduce stock numbers.
This framework has been the guiding line of many livestock development projects in
Sub-S aharan Africa (Lawry et al. [1984]; Hopcraft [1981]; Crotty [1980]). Its policy
imp li cation is the development of private exclusive property rights for an internalization
of ex ternalities.
This approach has been criti cized as inapplicable to many livestock situations since for
the vast majority of cattle producers the circumstances, besides the sociocultural
backgro und, require some form of communa l tenure maintenance. These circumstances
are the average small herd size and institutional constraints forrnatching them with discrete
small pieces of land, and the need for quick response to highly variab le rainfall patterns and
low producti vity range (Lawry et al. [ 1984]).
According to Runge [ 198 1], there also has been a misdiagnosis in the modeling of the
tragedy of commons and , furthern1ore, a limitation in the institutional alternatives
proposed. The tragedy of commons is not aN-person variation of a prisoner's dilemma
with a noncooperative assumption, strict dominance of individual strategies, separabi lity
of individu al cost fun ctions, and the need for a compulsory enforcement by an outside
auth ority for any solution. Rather, reconsidering the short-run profit motive as a causal
agent , Runge [ 198 1] argu es that the prob lem of the commons is one of decision making
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under uncertai nty where strategic interdependencies and nonseparable externalities
dete1mine the marginal conditions for profit maximization in grazing decisions and herd
numbers. For Runge, the institutional answer to overgrazing lies in devising mechanisms
that guarantee that choices wi ll be made collectively. These choices will lead to a security
of expectation or assurance that the cooperative institutions will act as endogenous
responses to the uncertainty of social and economic interactions (Runge (1981]).
In a case such as central rangelands of Somalia, there are no such institutions, even
though in the past, there had been a traditional regulation of access to pasture.
Unfort unately, that regul ation broke down as a result of population growth, technological
chan ges, cyclical climatic disasters, and the power shift during the colonial era (Lawry et

a! [ 1984]).
Given that pastoralists face a capital constraint, they cannot separate production
deci sions from consumption decisions. They have to produce what they want to consume.
Conseq uentl y, they w ill seek to maximize herd size. However, the increased herd size will
adverse ly affect the future forage productivity. Hence, the question is what management
strategy w ill lead to herd maximi zati on witho ut degrading the rangelands .
All of the above d iscussed models ignore the impact of grazing on future range
co ndi tions and production . In thi s study, a dynamic economic model that incorporates both
cu rrent and future period impacts of the range land management decisions on forage and
livestock productivity will be developed. The model will be used to investigate how
optimal herd size varies between rangeland with controlled and those with uncontro ll ed
expl oitatio n, and what social institutions can bring about a unifi ed control of rangelands.
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CHAPTER III
MODEL FORMULATION

Pastorali sts in the central regions of Somalia raise three classes oflivestock: camels,
cattl e, and small stock (goats and sheep). This diversity of livestock species provides a
vari ety of ani mal products for each household and, in aggregate, at low stocking rates,
permits max imum exploitation of the sparse vegetation. This diversity also limits the risk
of herd devastation by unforeseen catastrophes such as drought. However, to make the
mathemati cal implementation of the model manageable, this study dealt with cattle only.
Cattle, as other li vestock cl asses, provide the pastoralists with milk, meat, cash, and other
flow benefit s that flo w fi·om the animal as a living resource. These flow benefits include
securit y, power, liq uidity, presti ge, aestheti c pleasure, etc. These benefits exist because
cattle are perceived as producti ve assets. Cattle have value because of their abil ity to
con vert forage into usefu l products. The widespread appreciation of their value, and their
relat ive ease of transportati on (on foot) , means cattle can be liquidated easi ly. Owners of
cattl e deri ve security from the exchange value, determined mainly by their use as a source
of milk and meat, and may obtain status and prestige among other people because of this
economic wealth. However, these benefits are joint products with milk and meat, and
there fore, will not be included into the model.
The central rangelands of Somali a are communally owned. ln this study we want to
com pare two all ocation mechani sms. The first is the private ownership solution where
som eone owns the rangeland and dec ides how many animals should be grazed there. The
seco nd is the so lut ion where th e rangeland is owned in common by the dwellers of the area
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and access to it is free and unrestricted. In both cases the herder's problem is to maximize
the level of utiiity derived from grazing the rangelands subject to a set of constraints.
However, there exists a corresponding net s urplus problem that yields the same solution
values. Hence, this sntdy used the net surplus maximization approach.
In the case of private ownership, the herder takes into consideration the effect of
his/her grazing decisions on the future availability of forage and therefore wi ll graze the
number of animals that correspond to where the marginal factor cost equals to the value of
the marginal product. That is, the herder takes into consideration the shadow value of the
forage. This equates the present va lue of the forage with the discounted present value of
the retu m stream which can be generated by that forage if it is left unharvested. This
number of animals wi ll make forage demand equal to forage production. Any additional
animal grazed in the area will make forage demand exceed forage production and will
result in forage degradation and the herder will have to pay the cost of this impact. This
gives the herder grazing in a privately owned rangelands the incentive to preserve the
forage stock . In the case of commons, the shadow value of forage is ignored, and hence
the future va lue of forag e is ignored leading to over consumption today relative to the
optimum consumption. This leads to a degradation of the rangelands . This could be
interpreted as that in th e case of communal grazing (unrestricted private exploitation), the
cost of the impact of grazin g an additional animal will be shared by all herders that graze
the area. Eac h one w ill have to pay a small fraction of this cost. Any herder who engages
in any effon to preserve or protect the forage will not be able to capture the benefit of that
effon because of Jack of exclusive property rights. However, the benefits drawn from
grazing an additional animal are enjoyed solely by the herder. This means that the herder
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grazi ng in a communally owned rangeland has the incentive to increase his/her herd to the
point where forage utili zation exceeds the efficient forage utilization because he/she ignores
the shadow value of the forage .
This year' s fo rage production depends on last year's forage stock and this year's
rainfall. However, rainfall is a random variab le which we model using a discrete density
fun ction that can take any of J values with certai n probability. Hence, the relevant problem
for the herder is one of maximi zing the expected net surplus from animals and forage over
a multiperiod planning horizon.
In thi s chapter, an expected net surplus maximization model is developed and its first
order conditions are stated. However, this problem is very complicated and difficult to
so lve. Therefore, a determini sti c mode l that uses the average annual rainfall is developed
and used for thi s study. Th is detem1inistic model is one of maximizing net surplus
eva luated at the mean. The problem with thi s approach is that the sol ution values of the
co nt rol and state vari ab les obtained using the net surplus maximi zation evaluated at the
meun model are biased.
To show the direction of the bi as, two discrete time optimal control theorems, one with
uncertai nt y and one without uncertainty, were developed using simpl e problems. These
theorems are based on Bellman 's dynamic programing wi th backward recursion. The
so lut ion values of the control and state variabl es suggested by these two theorems are
compa red to show the directi on of the bias.
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Expected Net Surplus Maximization

Let the annual rainfall in a g iven year be a random variable that can assume one of 1
J

distinct values with probabilities k,, where

Lk

j

= 1.

Thus, R, is a vector of the amount

j=i

of rainfall in year y wi th elements~ ·'' wherej is the state of rainfall. Hence,~ .• gives, for
state of rainfall j , the amount of rai nfall in year t.
We define X, andY, as vectors of the number of female and male cattle that are owned
by the household in year t. X, and Y, are state vectors w ith elements X; . , and Y; . , ,
respectively, where i is the age of the animal (the number of females and males of age i that
are owned by the household in year t) .
Next we define X' , and

x: as vectors of the number of female animals that the

household co nsumes or are sold in year t with elements

x:.,, and X~ .• , respectively (the

number of fema le animals of age i that are consumed or sold by the household in year t).
Similarly, we define Y', and Y' , as vectors of control variables and denote the number of
mal e a nimals that the household consumed and sold in year t with elements

v:., and Y~·''

respect ive ly (the number of male animals of age i that the household consumed and sold
in year t, respectively). Z, is defined as a scalar of the number of animals owned by the
househo ld in year t, (L , (X;,, - X';,,- X',, + Y;,, - Y\,- Y';,.)).
Let FA,(R,,,, F,. ,) be the forage available in year t,

where~ ..

is amount of rainfall in

yeart and F, 1 is the forage stock in yeart- 1. Now, let FCi.,(x,, y., FA,(~ ·'' F,)) be, for state
of rainfall j , the amount of forage consumed by the animals in year t which depends on the
number of animals and the amount of forage available in the range in year t (FA.). FCi.• is
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composed of FC;.•' and FC,/ forage consumed by the female and male stock in year t and
state of rainfall j, respectively.
ow, let MJ<,,, be a scalar of the state variable of the amount of milk produced in
year t.

Mf<,,, is given by the number of lactating animals times the average milk

production .

MJS,,

( I)

where ( a t

FC'' ' )
h----;:--

- - I: (
.x;,, - x;,, - X,,,
( hFe,;)
c

a+

X1

, )

• b,

I

is the average milk production,

7(.x;,

1 -

x;~1 - x;~1 )

•

b,

is the

number oflactating females , b, is the annual birth rate in year t. The assumption here is that
all transacti ons, purchases, consumption, and sales take place at the beginning of the year.
Let P'"k, be the price per liter o f milk in year t. Also let P", be a vector of the price of
a reproducing fema le in year t with elements P ~ .• where i is the age class. We define P'" as
a sca lar of the price per kilogran1 of meat. We define Wi.< as a vector of state variables that
denote, for state of rainfall j, the weight of an animal in year t with elements W;,;,, where
i the age of the an imJI.
Pastoralists in the central rangelands of Somalia earn small amounts ofnonlivestock
income from their relati,·es in the urban areas. Also, they incur a relatively small cost in
maintaining

th~ir

herds. These costs include cost of watering and cost of maintaining the

hea lth of their Ji , ~s tock . However, it is assumed that the herder's non livestock income and
cost oflivestod, production offset each other, and neither of these factors will be included
in th e mod el. I knee. the income for the pastoral household in the central rangelands of
Somali a comes L'lltirely from livestock husbandry, that is, from the milk and the live
ani mal s thJt

ar~

so ld .
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In the case of private ownership, the herder who earns no significant non livestock
income manages his/her herd so as to maximize the expected net surplus over a multi period
planning hori zon. The herder's objective is to maximize the expected present value of the
net surplus subject to a set of constraints . The expected net surplus is defined as
consumer's plus producer's expected surplus for the herder. The expected net surplus can
be wrinen as
T

(2)

E[NS ]

L e _.., L fs(NMJS,, + NX,
1• 1

+

Nlf.,)

J

where NMK,.,, NX,, NYi." are, for state of rainfall j, the net surpluses from milk, female,
and male animals so ld and consumed by the household in year t, respectively.
The herder's demand curves for the milk , fema le, and male animals for consumption ,
D(MK ,'), D(X,'), and D(Y,'), respectively, are assumed to be negatively sloping. However,
he/she is assumed to be a price taker in the market for milk, female, and male animals . It
is also assumed that the transaction costs are negligible. Hence,
MK'

(3)

MIS;

NMJS,, = J D(MKJ.~)dMK," + P,""'
0

X'

(4)

NX, =

f D(X,")dX1c + PR' .X,'
0

Y'

(5)

Nlj,• = f0 D(Y,

c

s1

c

)dY1 + P' . Y1 -~J

Eq uati o n (2) is maximi zed subj ect to constraints on the magnitude of milk production
(equ ation ( I)) and the va lues of th e cont rol variables and the Jaws of motion . The
constrai nts on the comrol variables are as follows :
(6)

x;,, -x;~, -x;:, ~ 0

fo r all i and 1
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-Y/, - ~~~ ~ 0

~.,

(7)

for all i and t

(8)

~., - ~; - ~.~ ~ 0

(9)

~~~ ~ 0

for all j and I

(10)

~~ ~ 0

for all j and t

for all j and r

(II)

x;>

( 12)

Y/,

( 13)

x;>

0

for all i and I

(14)

~.~ ., 0

for all i and t

0

for all i and 1

~ 0

for all i and I

The laws of motion for the state variables, X, and Y, are given by
(I 5)

(16)

~ · I ; A(Y,

-Y/ - ~·) + .!_B(X, - X,c - X,').
2

where

A

0

0

1- dl ,t

0

0

0

0

1- d2 ,t

0

0

0

0

l - d 3,t

0

0

0

0

0

0

0 l - d,4 ,t 0
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bI b, b,
0
0

B

0
0

b, 0

0

0

0

0
0
0

0

0

0 0 0 0 0 0

where d;.. is the average death rate for animals of age i in time t and b, is average birth rate
in tim e t.
A and B are M-square matrices where M is equal to culling age (15 years) fo r females.

A

The products

(x, - X,c - x,')

and

A

(r, - Y,c- r,')

adj ust

X,,,

and

Y1, 1

,

rcsp~ct i ve l y for deaths, purchases, consumption, and sales; and this mo ves it to X; . 1 ,,. 1

and

Y, . 1,, • 1

product

,

respectivel y. Each year each age group becomes older by one year. The

~ s(x, - x,< - x;')

gives the number of the newborn females and males (each

being one half of the total newborns) fro m the redefined female and m ale stocks and
places them in the one-year-old categories.
There arc oth er fac tors, besides reproduction , deaths, slaughters, purchases, and sa les,
that change thL· hml size. These factors include : gifts (animals acqui red as gifts); loan
repayment (am mal s to re pay li vestock loans); and exchange offtake (animals sent to other
households).

T h ~sc t~-pcs

hard co nditt oth
A ss um11 1~

of interactions happen on ly occasionall y when there are very

I knee. th ey are not inc luded in thi s model.
a (Ompcttti ve market, the val ue of an animal that is so ld for meat depends

on it s weigh t Th L· weight of the animal depends on the amount of herbage consumed by
the anim al. LL·t \\'G, _, be. for state of rainfa ll j, a vector of yearly weight gain of an an imal
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in year t with elements W"'·' where i is is the age of animal. WGJ.I·' depends on the amount
of forage consumed per animal (FC,,).
(17)

WGJ ,I, I =

JlJ 1'1YC,/, ' ,· )

where FC/fy, is the amount of forage consumed per animal in year t. For state of rainfall
j, the weight of an animal of age i in year tis given by

( 18)

Wj,,,,

= WG1.1 - t,1 - t + w, _t.t - t

This is the motion equation for the state variable,

w,,,.

The motion equation for the forage stock is given by

(19)

For state ofrainfallj, next year's forage stock is given by the sum of current year's forage
stock, F,, and next year's forage production, Ri.<+1F,q, less next year's forage consumption.
The problem for the herder grazing in a privately owned rangeland is to maximize the
ex pected present value of the income stream from animals and forage . Ln the case of
common ownership, the problem is to maximize the expected present value of the income
stream from animals subject to forage constraint with the value of marginal product of
forage being driven to zero .
Given the specifications of the model, the problem is to determine the values of the
cont ro l variables, at each point of time, which maximize the objective function (2) subject
to th e milk production (I) , the restrictions on the control variables (described by the
inequalities (6) through ( 14)), and the laws of motion (given by ( 15), (16), ( 18), and (19)) .

23
The discrete time optimal control literature contains extensive general discussions of
the discrete time maximum principle{Abadie [1970] ; Butkovskii [1963] ; Jackson and Hom
[ 1965]; Katz [ 1962]; Polak [1971 ]). ln this section, the maximum principle for this specific
probl em is stated, and th e necessary conditions are exami ned.
The maxi mum principl e is a theorem whi ch states that the constrained maximization
of equation (2) can be decomposed into a series of subproblems. In each time period, the
fo ll owing

ex pect ed

Hamiltonian

X,', Y/, Y,' .~.~, ~.:

is

maximi z ed

with

respect

subj ectto the constraints (equations {I), (6) through (16), ( 18),

and ( 19)).
The expected Hamiltonian for year t is

E[H,] =

e -"~ kAN~·' +NX, +Nl},,) +(
+'1'; .

(20)

• E,,. 1 [F,

+

+

E[A. ]

'

=

1 [(

A+

~B) (x, - X/ -x,')]

(r, - r,C - r,') +~s(x,- x,c - x,')]

R1,, . 1F/
+

where

- FC1 ,, .t(x, .pY, .pFA1,(R1,,,F,)) ]
1 (WG1 ,, . 1 + W,)

w:.

e -rt[ aEfNs,'(X,, Y,,MK,,F,)]l
ax,

(t = !, ... ,T).

Using the envelop th eorem, this can be written as:

E[),,] =e -rtt k1 [
(21)

(

to

D(~. t - ~:,) +(P,ml

1 ) ).. +-B
1 \j! - ~
aFc E,
• A +-B
(
2
,. 1 2
,. 1

ax,

+v1 +

1)( a +h F~:,) !!,)

awo

,.t + ----LL!.
ax, w ,.1 + Tj'

(t =! , ... ,T- 1) .

)

24

ln addition,

E[\jl ] = e_,,[aE[Ns,·(x,,Y,,MK,,F,)]]
aY,

(t = I, ... ,T).

I

E[..,,~ ]

_

E[~,] - e

=

e-n[aEfNs,·(x,, Y,,MK,,F,)J]
aF,

-n~
7 "J [(I +qRJ ..f',

9 _1

(23)

[+(I +Pmlc +v1)(a +h

(24)

E[ro,]

=

(

I ,... , T) .

awa1.1• 1 ) ' ro,.1DCMJS,, _ MJS,), ]

F~·')b,~,]

(t = I ,... ,T - 1) .

aw,

aFc ~1 • 1 +ro,. 1]
e-"L [P' . Y,' - ~
1

=

) ~, . 1 + ~

E[(J) ] = e-n[aEfNs,·(x,, Y,,MK,,F,)J]
'

(t

aw,

(t

=

I, ... ,T) .

(t

=

I ,... , T - I) .

The Lagrangian function for the problem can be written as

_

L, - E[H,] + ~~

(25)
+

11Jx ;_,

[[a +h-;:FC/,) "'~(X,,, - X,; - X,,, b,
c

, )

]

-X,,~ - x;:,J+ EJ Y;, , - Y;.~ - Y/,] + v,[MJS; -MIS.~ -MIS.:]
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Here the derivatives with respect to vectors are gradient vectors.
so lution function in the year

E[NS, . 1 OJ is the

t + I , which can be conceptualized as the result of an

appl icat ion ofBellman's optimality principle and backward recursion . The costate vectors
for

the

problem

are

denoted

by

E[A,], E[IJI,], E[l;,], and E[w,]. Of these,

£[).,] and E[IJI,] represent the expected shadow values of female and male cattle,
respectively. The expected shadow value of the weight of cattle measured in kilograms is
denoted by E[w,]. Finally, the expected shadow value of the forage stock is denoted by
E[l;,). The necessary conditions for the above optimization problem are

(26)

(27)

aL,

-

3

aX;,,

(2 9)

,.

· Xi, l =0

aL, . X;~,

ax/,

=

0

ifor all i and t)

ifor all i and t)
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(30)

ar, _ _,.,L ( c aFc1,,
awGu
- e
fs· D(Y,) - --E,,. 1 + - ro,. 1 ar,c
1
ar,<
ar,<
ar,
c
- -· rl,r

(3 1)

ar,
ar,'

_ _,.,P,y,,

- e

- A ij/ 1 . 1 -

L k (aFc1,, E,
1

1

ar,'

(33)

1. 1 +

awG ,,
ar,'

1 ror-1
--

- E,

(for all i and I)

(34)

ar,

-c

aMJS.r

(3 5)

=

" k D(MJS,, -MJS)
, - P,m1c - v,)
e "( ~
1

s 0

I

, . MJS,c
-araMJS.~
.

=

o

(for all j and I)

=

0

(for all j and I)

(36)

oL,

(37)

s

aMJS.r

. MK'
], t
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(38)

" k/ a +h--)
FC1,, ( :[ (X ,, - X ,,c
-,cL,
- -_ L
1
1
Cflr

j

X1

s 0

(for all i and 1)

= 0

a r;.~

(32)

)

Aiji _ - E
1 1
1

1• 1

-x;,,s) b, )

~

0

)

s 0
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aL 1

(39)

(for all t)

J.ll ; 0

a J.ll

aLl

(40)

aTil

;

c

I

~ . 1 - ~,1 - ~.1 ~ 0

(for all t)

(41)

(42)

aL

- 1· e

(43)

a£

•

__

0

(for all t)

I
1

.
aL 1
c
I
a:; ; ~.~ - ~.~ - ~.~~o

(44)

I

(45)

aL 1

•

~.v1

; 0

ifor all t)

avl

Maximi zation of et Surplus Evaluated at the Mean

The above problem is complicated by the fact the annual rainfall enters the problem
as a random variable . However, if rainfall enters the problem at its mean, that is if we use
average annual rainfal l,

R, then the problem becomes deterministic.

problem is o ne of max imizin g net surplus eva luated at the mean.
In this problem , th e objective function is

This means the
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T

NS =

(46)

L e -"(NMK, +NX, +NY,)
t: l

and the j subscript drops from the milk production equation (equation ( 15)), the net surplus
from milk, fema le, and male consumption and sales (equations ( 17), ( 18), and ( 19)), and
the motion eq uations of forage stock and wei ght, equations (25) and (26) . The rest of the
problem remains the same. The Hamiltonian for year t is

H,
(47)

=

e-"(NMK, +NX, +NY,) +(t[(
+

+

A+tB) (x,-X/ -X/) ]

ljl;.+(r, - Y/- r,') +ts(x, -x,c -x,s)]
~, . 1 [F, + RF/ - FC, . 1(x 1 • 1 ,y1 _1'FA,(R,F,))]
+

w;.t(WG, . 1 + W,}
(t = l, ... ,T).

Usi ng the envelop theorem , this can be written as

(48)

In addition,

(t = l, ... ,T).

(49)
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I;

=

e.,[aNS .(X Y,MK ,F
1,

1

(50)

1 )]

(t

.,[ (l +qRF
- q-1) ~ 1 • 1 + ( ~
awa1.1)' ro

= e

/;1

1

1

aF1

I

1

[+ (I +P"'* +v1)(a +h~~1 )b 1 j.11 ]
ro =

1

1

1

1 )]

1

I, ... , T) .

)
+D(MK1 - MK1·]

(t = l, ... ,T - l).

e·"[ aNS .(X ,Y ,MK ,F

(t = l, ... ,T).

awl

I

1• 1

=

The Lagrangian function for the problem can be written as

L1

(52)
+

=

11JX,. X1.~
1 -

H 1 + 1-11 [( a +h
-

X1: 1 ] +

F~,') 7(X,. -x,; -X,: )b
1

1

EJ Y Y1.~ Y/

1]

-

1• 1 -

[MKj.

+ v1

1 -

The costate vecto rs for the problem are denoted by 1..1 ,
),

1

and

~1 1

lj/1 ,

1]

MKj.~ - MKj~]
1;1 , and ro1 •

Of these,

represent the shadow values of female and male cattle, respectively. The shadow

va lue o f the we ight of catt le measured in kilograms is denoted by ro,. Finally, the shadow
va lue of th e fo rage stock is denoted by

~. -

The necessary conditions for the above

optimizati o n problem are

C<L,. = - e ·n
(53)

ax,

( D(MK, - MK,)
• +(P mk +v + !)(a +hFC,
- ))
1

j.l 1 +e

·rtp 1R

xl

1 ) ),, _ - -Bij/
1
aFC
- A + -B
-1 1;1_1 + -aWG
- r 1o1_1) - Tj 1 $ 0
_ - (1
1 1
(

2

2

x,•

ax,•
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(54)

(for all i and t)

(55)

(56)

aL,

c

- - . ~.t

=

a~~~

0

(for all i and t)

(58)

(for all i and t)

(60)

(for all i and t)

(6 1)

(62)

aL,
aws.~

(63)

c

· MJS.r

=

0

(for all j and I)
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(64)

aL,
a ~~

(65)

(66)

-aL, ;

af.l,

,

·~.t

0

(for all j and t)

(a +h-FC,) ( L:IS (~.r -~.rc -~.r, ) b, )
x,

,. ]

0

2

0

(for all t)

The rest of the first-ord er conditions for this problem are the same as those of the
problem of maximizing the expected net surp lus.
In the case of the commons, the herder ignores the shadow value of the forage

(~).

Hence, from equations (57), (58), (60), (62), (64), (66), and (68), the terms involving ~,. 1
drop . Also equat ion (59) comp letely drops.
The prob lem for the pri vate ownership scenario was formulated as a discrete time
optimal control problem and was solved using GAMS/MINOS.

Since the objective

function and some of the constraints were nonlinear, GAMS/MINOS employed a projected
lagrang ian algorithm (see Munagh and Saunders (1982] for details ofthis algorithm). This
involves a sequence of major iterations, each of which requires the solution of a linearly
co nstrained subproblem. Each subproblem contains linearized version of the nonlinear
co nstraint s as well as th e original linear constraints and bounds.
GAMS/MINOS used the reduced-gradient algorithm to maximize the augmented
lagrangian (objective functional) subject to a set of linearized nonlinear constraint, linear
constraints, and bounds. To assure convergence, initial activity levels were carefully
specified for all variables and sensible upper and lower bounds were set for all variables.
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The problem for the commons was solved by solving the necessary conditions as a set
of simultaneous equation, after dropping the tenns th::.t involved ~'+ '' using GAMS/MINOS.
To solve the set of simultaneous equations, two positive parameters were selected. One
was added and th e other was subtracted from each equation. A lso, a new variable, which
is the difference between the two parameters, was defined as the objective function. This
objective function was minimized subject to a set of constraints using GAMS/MINOS. To
so lve this problem , GAMS!MINOS employed a projected lagrangian algorithm.
The solutions va lu es of the control variables obtained using the net surplus
maximi zation evaluated at the mean, that is, using the average rainfall, are biased. To show
this bias, let us develop discrete time optimal control models for the expected net surplus
maximizat io n and the net surp lus maximization evaluated at the mean. For simp licity, we
assume that there are two state (x 1 and x2 ) a nd two control (u 1 and u2) variables.

Discrete Time Optimal Control Model with Uncertainty

A ss um~

there arc t\\O state variables (x 1 and x 2) and two control variables (u, and u,).

Further assume· that rainfall is a random variable which we model using a discrete density
function tlwt can take an) of J values with given probabilities. Hence, the relevant problem
for the h e rd~r ''one· of maximizing the expected net surplus generated by the state variab les
over a mult!pc·nod planning horizon subject to a set of motion equations . This problem can
be written as
T- 1 K

(67) Max :

Fj .\S, (x 11 , u, R)]=

I I

1= 1 k-1

(68) S.t. :

K

f, 0 (x,,u,, R)k1 +

L S(xr )
k=l

33
U1 E

U,

x0 is given

where x, is a vector of length 2 of the values of the state variables in year t, wi th elements
x,,,. I = 1,2; u, is a vector of length 2 of th e control variables in year t with elements u1,,.
I= 1.2;

f" (x,. u,. R)

is a vector of the instantaneous payoff function for year t discounted to

year zero ; S(xr) is a vector of the scrap valu e function discounted to year zero; u is a vector
of length T with elements u,; x is a vector of length T with elements x,; U, is the set of
adm1ssible control, u,, at time t; R is a random variable with mean zero and standard
dev iation I ; and NS 0(x 0 , u, R) is the objective functional. Its value depends upon the
start ing po int, x0 , and the value of control variables u, for t=I, .. .,T.
The vector u is ca ll ed a trajectory or time path o f control variable. For a given
admissible u there is a traj ectory of the state variable, x, which is the solution to equation
(68) with ini tial condit ion x0 .
The problem , therefore, is to selec t u to maximize equation (67) subject to the
constraint s.
Assum e that the problem has a solution and examine some of the characteristics of the
so lu tio n using dynami c programming with backwards recursion.
To do this, let nand m be the years that are one year and two years pri or to the terminal
time. respectively, i.e., T- 1 and T-2 , respective ly. Then solve the problem for time n. Then
mo ve one year closer to th e present and so lve the problem for time m using the sol uti on
va lu es of time n. Continue moving backwards one year at a time until you get to the
pres ~nt

time.
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The problem in equations (67) and (68) can be rewritten for time n as
T- 1 K

(69) Max:

E[NS,(x,, u,R)]=

K

I L /,, (x,,u,, R)ki + L S(xr)
0

1= 1 k - 1

k= l

(70) S.t.:

x, is given.
lnse11 (70) into (69)

(71)

Define E[

(72)

s; (x,)] to be th e solution func tion.
JE[NS,; ] =
Oxl/

t kj( ~·o + S' ( l + ~·oxn )J

= 0.

ox"

j =l

Now move backwards one year closer to the present to time m and rewrite the problem in
equa tion (67) and (68) as

~I

(73) Max:E[NS,(x,,u , R)]=

K

K

II

J,,?(x"',u"', R)ki

1= 1 k- 1

(74 ) S.t. :

Xn =XIII+
U 111 E

Um

xm is given.

Insert (74) into (73)

~~~ (X 111 , u 111 , R)k 1

+I

k= l

NS;(x,)
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oE[ NS
IJu.,

(75)

oE[NS,;,]
i/:tm

(76)

;,1 = f

k (
1

j=l

=

tJ.f.~ + oE[ NS~ ] tJ.f"' ) = O
Oum

i/:tn

iJum

f k, ( tJ.f.~ +iJE[Ns,;] (I+tJ.f"' )J = O.
j= l

i/:t"

i/:tm

i/:tm

No te that n could be set equal to any time, t = 2, .. .,T-1 , with m = n-1 ; therefore, the
results for time nand m, eq uations 71 and 75 could be generalized for any time, t, as

(77)

Now let us define the costate variables using the results obtained above so far. The
va lue of the vector of costate variabl es fo r the terminal time (PT) could be defined as

(78)

In add itio n, the vec tor for the change in the in the values of the costate variables as we
move fro m time n to the teJminaltim e (T) is given by

-l'lP

(79)

II

=P
"

- P
r

f
= L.
; =t

0
(iJStJ.fn+iJ/,,
-)

k
;

Ox r Ox"

Ox"

.

ow, by co mhimng 7S. 79. and 72 , we can define the values of the costate variab les for
tim e n (P, ) as

(80)

He nce, P, is

;1 '

c·rtor o f the ex pected shadow value of x,.

By mo\ m:: hack\\ ards o ne year from time n to time m, we can define the vector of the
cha nge in th e' a lues o f the costate variables that correspond to this move as
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(81)

-

1

= pm -

!'J. P
m

p

"

=~
L.,

k

;= I

(

t3E[NS']
:tr
n UJ m

t3x

l

0
:¥ )
_u; _'"'

t3x+ox

n

m

m

.

Next by combining 80, 8 1, and 76 we can see that

(82)

Thi s implies that Pm is vector the expected shadow value ofx, ..
Since n could be set equal to any time period, t=l , .. ., T-2, with m=n-1 , the above
results for time n and m co uld be generali zed for any time period, t, as

(83)

- !'J. P

t

=p

1

- p
I

I+ )

= L.
~

k

(

}

t3E[NS't+l ] UJ
:trI

j= l

(84)

.

CE[ NS;, ,]
&
and

w1th P,,, =

;o__

;o__
V A,

u ..t, + l

P, =

0

:¥" )
_ ''+ _u;;o__
v.x..,

t3E[ NS,']

Ox,

t+l

.

The expected Hamiltonian for the above prob lems of time nand m can be wri tten as
J

(85)

E[H.,(xn,u,, R)] =

Lk
j= l

(86)E[H,(x ..,, u..,, R)]

~
= L.,
;=I

(

1

0
(/,,

(x,,un, R) + S'(xn,+ fn(x n, un , R)))

0

k 1 f .. (x., ,u,, R) +

O'E[NS,;]
)
,
(x..,,+ f.,(x., , u.,, R))
OXn

These expected Hamil tonia n cou ld be generali zed for any time peri od, t, as

~

(87)E [H,(x,, u, , R)] = 7;, k 1 !, (x,, u,, R) +
(

0

t3E[NS,',, ]

ox,,,

)
(x,,+f, (x,, u,, R))
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The prob lem is one of finding the optimal value of the vector of control variables at
time t (u.) that maximizes the expected net surplus for the same time.

Hence, by

differentiating equation (87), we can get

(88)

Combining information in (88), (84), and (77) yields

= iJNS,

iJE[ H , ]

iJu,

iJu,

given that (88) and (71) are evaluated at the same x, and u,.
Therefore, ifu', maximizes E[NS,(x,, u., R)] for a given x., then E[H,(x,, u,, R)] has a
stationary value at u', for the same x,. This implies, equation (88) equals zero at these
va lues of x,, and u,.
Finall y, let us define the laws of motion for the state and costate variables, as we move
from one time period, t, to the next, t+ I, using the above results. The Jaw of motion for the
state variables can be defin ed as

(89)

whereas, the Jaw of moti on for the vec tor of costate variables can be defined as
1

(90) nP,

iJE[ H )
= P,.J - P, = - ---'=- [ I

fo rt=T-1 , T-2, ... , I
and

Ox,

J= l

(

;vo

k, _v;_''- +

Oxt

iJE[NS' )
;;r )
I+ I
( I +~)
iJx,+1
OX,

]
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(91)

is the terminal va lue of the vector of the costate variab les.
Given u' [u ' ,, u' 2,
x ' [x',, x' 2,

a)

... ,

... ,

u', ] is a so lution to the problem for initial x = x0, then

x',] can be calcu lated using equation (68), u', x0 .
J

b)

E[H, (x; ,u;, R)]

=I kA/, 0 (x; ,u; ,R) + P,. , (x, ,+ /, (x; ,u;, R)))
j =l

is a stationary value of E[H,] with respect to u,.

Detem1inistic Discrete Time Optimal Control Model

T he deterministic di screte time optimal control model is the same as the one we just
desc ribed above excep t that the average rainfall is used in this model instead of using
rain fal l as a rando m variabl e. This makes this model deterministic. Hence, the prob lem
facing the herder becomes one of maximizing the net surplus evaluated at the mean subject
to a set of constraints.
T- 1

(92) Max:

NS 0 (x 0 ,u)

=I /,

0

(x,,u,) + S(xr)

t =i

(93) S.t.:

X ,. t =X,+ j,(X, ,u, )
u,

E

U,

x0 is given.
Given a trajectory for a given admissi bl e control variables, there exists a trajectory of
state variables wh ich a so lution to equation (93) w ith initial condition x•. Therefore, the
problem is to select the values of the control variab les to maximize equation (92) subject
to th e constrain ts.
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Let us exami ne some of the characteristics of the solution, assuming that the problem
has a solution, usi ng dynami c programming with backwards recursion. We will start with
so lvi ng th e problem for the year just prior to the terminal year, n (T-1).
The prob lem in equations (92) and (93) can be rewritten for time n as

(94) Max:

NS,(x, ,u)

(95) S.t. :

= /,0 (x,,u,) + S(xT)

X T =X,+ / , (X, ,u, )

xn is given.
Now, collapse (95) into (94) and differentiate the objective function with respect to the
contro l vari ables to obtain

(96)

De fin e Ns; (xn) to be the so lution function. Hence,
0

rJNS'
-" = _vJx_'"-+ S ' ( I + _vlx_•n_ ) = 0 .

(97)

&,

&,

&,

Now move backwards one year closer to the present to time m and rewrite the problem
as

(98) Max:

(99) S.t.:

u,

E

U,

xm is given .
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Inse11 (99) into (98) and differentiate wi th respect to

u, to get

(100)

(10 1)

ote, n could be set equal to any I = 2, ... ,T-I with m = n-1, therefore, the results for
time n and m, equations (96) and ( I 00) could be generalized as

(102)

Next, we define the costate variables and the changes in the values of the costate
variables using the result s obtained above. The value of the vector of the costate variable
for the terminal time (Pr) could be defined as
( 103 )

Pr

iS
=a·
T

Also the change in the values of the costate variabl es as we move from time n to the
tem1inal time could be defined as

( 104)

Hen ce, by combinin g ( 103), ( 104) , and (97) we get

(105 )

cJNS '
p =--"

n

Oxn '

which implies that P" is the expected shadow value of x".
By mov ing backwards one more year, we can define the vector of the change in the
va lues of the costate vari abl es that correspond to a move from time n to tim e n, as
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(106)

Combining ( 105), ( 106), and ( 101 ) yields

( 107)

which implies that P m is the expected shadow value ofxm.
These resu Its for times n and m could be generalized as

(108)

_ f.. p

=p

I

I

with ~ + I

( 109)

_ p

0

iJNS'r+_l _v;_
.:JI"
.:J/"
= __
•r + _v;_•r_

JNs;.

Ox,

Oxf+l Ox/

t+ l

=--1

and

P

oxr • l

JNs;

=- - .

I

ox(

The Hami ltonian for the above problems for time nand m written as
( 11 0)

( II I)

Hm(xm ,um)

=

o
JNs;
fm (xm, u, ) + ~(xm,+ fm(xm,um)) '
n

w hi ch could be generali zed for any time period, t, as

( 11 2)

To o bt ain the va lue ofu,that maxi mi ze the ne t surplus evaluated at the mean, differentiate
( 11 2) with respect to u,

( 11 3)

iJH(

iJ/, 0

iJNs;. iJf.

- - = - - + - - -1 - !Jut
!Jut
oxl+l !Jut .

Combini ng in fo m1ation in ( 11 3), (109) , and (102) yields
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du,

tJu'
I

given that ( 11 3) and (96) are evaluated at the same x, and u,.
Therefore, if u ·, maximi zes NS,(x,, u.) for a given x,, then H,(x,, u,) has a stationary
valu e at u·, for the same x, . This implies, equation (1 13) equals zero at these values ofx,,
and u,.
Finall y, define the laws of motion for the state and costate variables, as we move from
one time period , t, to the next, t+ I , using the above results. The laws of motion for the state
vari ables and the laws o f motion for the costate variables can be defined as
( 114)

iJH ,
!J.x, = x,. 1 - x, = - - = x, + J,(x,,u,)
iJP,+I
0

(115)

!J.P, = P,. l- P,

[ iJf,
iJNS,'. I
iJf, ]
= - iJH,
- = - - + - - ( 1+ - )

Ox,

Ox,

Ox,. I

Ox,

fo rt = T-1 , T-2 , ... , I,
respecti ve ly. Also, the tem1inal value of the vector of the costate variables is defined as
( 11 6)

iJS
P
-.
, =
Oxr

Given u"[ u" 1, u·,, .. ., u" ,] is a solution to the problem for initial x = x0 , then
a) x"[x" 1, x· ,, ... , x", ] can be calcu lated using equation (92), u·, x0 •

is a stationary value of H, with respect to u,.
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Direction of Bias

To determine the direction of the bias, we need to determine the effect of the random
vari abl e on the so lution va lues of the control variables. To do so, we compare the change
in the optimal expected net surplus at timet with respect to the control variab les at timet,
equation (77) with the change in the net surplus at timet resulting from the change in the
control variabl es at time t, equation ( I 02).
Assume that

0/,

0

-~- ,

- - , and, - - are concave in R, then by Jensen 's inequality

0/,

tJNS,'. I

OU; ,,

t3u;.,

ox,. t

f

k ( at(u,,,,x,,,,R)
j· I 1
aui,t

+

aNs,: 1 (x1, 1• 1 (u,,,)) aJ,(u,,,,x,,,,R)) <
axl,t·I
aul,t

( 11 7)

at(u,,x,,R)
au,,t
'

I

+

aNs,·o~ (x, .1 (u,)) aJ,( u,,x,Ji)
I

ax,,tol

0

0

t

au,,,

Deli ne U,, , to be the soluti on vector for the deterministic problem , i.e.,

( 11 8)

Thi s impli es that the stoch astic problem , evaluated using the solution vector of the
de term in ist ic pro bl em, is non-posi ti ve, i.e.,

( 11 9)

f k/( at( l{,,x,, ,,R)
J.1

au,,,

No11 de fin e 9,(h) such that

+

aNS, . 1 (x 1,,. 1 ( U,,)) aJ,(1{ 1,x1,,,R))
ax,,,.J
au,,,

~O
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with 9, (h}>O.

We are parameterizing the u;'s in such a way that as h increases the u;'s

move away from the soluti on values fo r the deterministic problem towards the solution
va lues for the stochastic problem. In other words, Ash increases toward zero, we posit that
at some h, say h0 , 9,(h0 )=0 for all i. We use these functions to examine the sign of

d, - u;(h ~ . Thi s gives us the direction of bias of the control variables.
Differenti ating equa ti on ( 120) with respect to h gives

( 122)

thi s cou ld be written as
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I ' 1, 0
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c1 /,o

tJx 2
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]

tNS ,
I
1 1

'

2
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2 0
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2
c_
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[

.

rf,

-' -•- ( --)
a,.,

I+ I

"2
t7X
I+ I

Pu

•

..... 2 .1

o2 NS
oh

r Ns,.,
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2

'

1"t ,tf"2J

rWs,. 1

the
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o2 Ns;. 1 t3f, t3f,
" '
ox~-- ~

Ouz.t Ou 1 .~
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of
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.
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expression is positive. The sign of

E[~~~ ] is indeterminatf' if the sign of the expression

is negative. However if we assume that the direct effect dominates the indirect effect, then

E[ ~~.t

]

<0 regardl ess of the sign of the expression. The direct effect is taken as

and the indirect effect is taken as

·

·

Usmg the same logic, we can show that

E[~'u.hi., ] <0.

Thi s means that the effect of the maximization of the net surp lus evaluated at the mean
on the stati onary state va lu es of the control variables is ambiguous. However, when the
direct effect is assum ed to dominate the indirect effect, the maximi zation of the net surp lus
evaluated a1 the mean wi ll result in larger stationary state values for at least some of the
co ntrol variahks
Usi ng th,· mntton
( 124)

we can sec tha t

( 12 5)

~quat i o n

x..,. 1

= x, + f(x;,, u.., (h), R)k1
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Hence, the maximization of the net surplus evaluated at the mean also leads to smaller
stati onary state values for the state variab les.
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CHAPTER IV
DERIVATION OF EQUATIONS FOR
THE COMPUTATIONAL MODEL

Forage Stock Difference Equation

It has been very well documented in the literature that rangeland productivity is
negati vely impacted through time by excessive forage demand through grazing pressure.
Tore II et al. [ 1991) found that range productivity increased under li ght grazing (4 hectares
per grazing steer) treatment, decreased under heavy grazing ( 1.3 hectares per grazing steer),
and remained relatively constant at the moderate grazing rate.
In addition to reduced herbage production, increased grazing intensity adversely
impacts range reso urce . It diminishes the range condition by changing the composition in
fa vor ofnonplatable plants. This results in reduced average daily weight gain and gain per
head . Thi s decl ine in livestock performance can be attributed to reduced forage intake and
diet quality. Dec reased forage avail abi lity reduces animal selectivity and forces grazing
anim als to select diets lower in quality. It also forces animals to spend more energy on
fo raging activ ity that could otherwise go into production.
In thi s study a linear first-ord er difference equation that incorporates these concepts
is used as the fo rage stock motion equation . Next year' s forage stock is considered to be
the sum of actual year's forage stoc k and next year' s forage production less the next year' s
forage consumption. A forage consumption greater/ less than the forage production in one
year will reduce/increase the stock of vegetation avai lable to produce forage next year.
Hence , next year's forage stock equa ls the actual year' s forage stock less or in addition to
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the forage productivity loss or gain due to next year' s grazing demand. The forage motion
equation can be written as
F,. , = F, + FP,. 1- FC,. , ,

(126)

where F,_, is next year 's forage stock; F, is actual year 's forage stock, FP,. , , and FC,. 1are
the next year's forage production, and forage consumption, respectively.
Next year's forage production is assumed to depend on the average annual
precipitation , R, and the amount of forage stock avai lab le to produce forage . A forage data
coll ect ed by Bekure and Pasha (1991] and actual annual precipitation data from the Central
Rangelands of Somalia were used to estimate forage production function. The specific
functional fo m1 of forage production used in this study is
FP,= Rf·5,,

(127)

where the average annual preci pitation is 200 mm .
ln the centra l rangelands of Somalia there are small droughts (mi ssing one of the two
rainy seasons) and big droughts (missing two of the two rainy seasons). However, thi s
study used the average annu al rainfall (average over all possible states of rainfall, i.e.,
nonnal , small drought. and bi g drought). A random sample of200 years of the annual
rain fall with a mean of200 mm was generated and used in this study.
Th e ann ual forage con sumption was calculated by assuming a daily intake of 3% of
body weight. .-\ nnual forage consumption is given by the sum over age of the number of
anim als muli1plll·J h:

th~ir

respective weights, required daily intake per animal (3% body

weight) , n tnnh~r uf hou s~ho ld s, N,, and the numberofdays in a year, 365 days. The annual
forage dem .111d c:n1 be "' ri tten as
( 128)

FC,

i\',(X, · X/ - X,' - X,'+ J'; - Y,' - l';'rw,(o.03 • 365).

50
The data used as the initial values for the forage stock in the central rangelands of Somalia
were adopted from Howze [1987].

Livestock Age- Weight Relationships

Due to unavailability of age-weight relationship data from birth to adult age, a growth
model is used to generate age-specific weights for both sexes. Various growth models are
available in the literature. The shape of the weight curve is sigmoidal and related to the
maturation pattern und er given environmental conditions.
In this study, the Gompertz curve has been used, because of its simplicity. The
Gompertz curve requires only three parameters for its computation and provides an
estimate of mean weight. The asymptotic limit of this model, as age (i) approaches the
heaviest weight attained by an animal , is an asymptotic mean weight. The within animal
weight variation due to short term fluctuation in body composition is averaged out. The
model also provides a measure of rate of maturation which refers to growth rate relative
to mature weight. The genetic and environmental factors that influence the s lope of the
weight curve or the asymptotic weight will influence the estimates of rate of maturation.
The point of inflection occurs where the estimated growth rate changes from an
increasing to a decreasing fun cti on. The rate of changes is maximum at the inflection
point. This model assumes a fixed point of inflection relative to mature weight. The
limit ations of the Gompertz curve stem from the assumptions of a fixed inflection point and
the tendency to overest imate early weights.
Th e general fom1 of the gompertz curve is

(129)

W = W: eb(l -•"'>
I

0

'
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where W; is weight at age I, W 0 is birth weight, b is In(W A/W 0), W A is adult weight, and m
is the rate of maturation which refers to growth rate relative to maturation weight. It is the
rate of decline in growth . The age at the inflection point is given by ln(b)/m. By letting
em= r, the above eq uation can be wri tten as
(130)
The initial data regarding weight of animals and age at the inflection point during normal
years have been chosen as the average val ues for these parameters in the central rangelands
of Somalia (Tab le 1).
The resulting equations for the normal s years are

w,

( 131 )

w,

(132)

= 16e 2.9B(H.255)')

= 14 . 5e2.924( t - (.216)~

for male cattle
for female cattle.

Tabl e 2 presents the results for both males and females of all livestock classes based
on the data in Table I. These weight data in Table 2 were used as the initial values of the
weight stock variab le.

Tabl e I. Growth data for the Gompertz curve
Data

Cattle
Male

Female

Adult wei ght (Kg)

315

270

Birth weight (Kg)

16

14.5

Age at infl ection point

0.8

0.7
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Table 2. Age-weight relationships for catt le by sex
Age
(years)

Cattl e weight (Kg)
Ma le

Female

I

147

144

2

260

236

Age
(years)

Cattle weight (kg)
Male

Female

9

3 15

270

10

315

270

3

300

262

II

315

270

4

3 11

268

12

315

270

5

314

270

13

3 15

270

6

3 15

270

14

315

270

7

315

270

15

3 15

270

315

270

8

Yearly Weight Gain

Weight gai n is a result of excess metabolizab le energy (ME) consumed by an animal.
Excess ME for an anim al is calculated by subtracting the ME required by the animal (ME')
from the ME avai lable for the animal (ME'). Metabolizable energy required by an animal
is found by summing the ME required for maintenance, activity, and production. In thi s
stud y a ME requirement for adult anima ls co ll ected by Coppock [ 1986] was used .
Co ppock [ 1986] found out that the ME requirement for an adult cattle is 79 MJ. By
dividing this adu lt ME requirement by the adult weight and multiplying by the actual
weight of the animal under consideration (W;_,), we get the ME requirement for an animal
of age i. Metabolizable energy available for an animal of age i is given by the product of
the amount of forage ava il ab le for that animal

( w,)A W . FJZ,.G. D J.M),

gross energy (G),
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di gestibility (Dl), and metabo lizability (M) of the forage . The ME requirement at timet
can be written as

( 133 )

,

F

AW

W

z,

1
ME" =- 1· ·-·G
·DI·M.

lfM e' > Me', the animal gains weight. However, if Me' < ME', the animal is in ME deficit
and hence loses weight. The energy required for a kilogram of weight gain or loss is
assumed to be 26 MJ ME/kg (Coppock [ 1986]). Thus, by dividing the excess ME avai lable
by the ME required for a kilogram of weigh t gain or loss, we get the typical weight gain
of an animal of age i in year t (TWG;_ ,). That is the amount in kilograms of weight the
animal gained or lost. Hence, TWG,_ , can be written as

( 134)

1WG
1,1

=

ME')
(ME"
1,1 1, 1
26

.

Typi cal weight gain gives the weight the animal could have gained given the amount of
forage availabl e and no physiological limitations. It is assumed that, in one year, the
maximum weight that an immature animal of age i can gain is eq ual to the difference
between the average weight of the animal in age i-1 and i plus 25% of its weight at age i.
However, the maximum that an animal can lose is 25 % of its body weight at age i. This
assumption sets an upper and lower bounds for the weight gain .

Animals have a

physiological limit for the amount of ME they can consume. A metabolizable energy in
excess of the physiol og ical limit of the animal cannot be consumed by the animal and
th erefore will not contri but e to the weight gain of the animal. If the ME available for the
anima l is below what is required for the maximum weight loss, the an imal will die.
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Defining the upper weight gain of an animal of age i in year t (UWG;.J as the actual
weight gain of the animal in year t, The UWG;,, is given by the minimum of the maximum
weight gain and the typical weight gai n.

(135)
Similarly, define yearl y weight gain of an animal of age i in year t (WG;..) as the maximum
of the UWG,,, and MNWG;.

(136)

Demand Functions

Because ofunavail ab ility of data to estimate the inverse demand function for milk, and
female and male anima ls consumed that are needed for the net surplus equations, this study
derived the inverse demand function assumi ng it to be linear.
(137)

P, =a+ bQ,,

where P, is the price of the product at timet and

Q, is the amount of the product consumed

at time l. The parameters (a and b) of the above equations are derived using price elasti city
of demand from the literature.
Given

(13 8)

aQ,P,
aP, Q,

ed = - - - ,

where e" is the elasticity of demand. Solve equati on (2) for aP,I aQ, (s lope of the in verse
demand cu rve) to obta in
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aP,

-

(139)

BQT

P,

=- - =b.
ed.Qt

Substi tuting eq uation ( 139) into equation (137) and solving for a (the intercept of the
inverse demand function) , we get
(140)

a=P,-bQ,.

A livestock study conducted in the central rangelands of Somalia by Abdulle [ 1990]
showed that the average milk price is So. Sh. 27.88/liter and the average price of meat was
So. Sh . l 50/kg. The average number of females and males consumed by the 180,000
households in the central rangelands of Somalia was 2.54 and 2.65, respectively.
Similarly, a study conducted in Niger by Cord-Guiot [1991] revealed that the price
elasticity of demand facing the herder as a supplier for milk was - 1.1 and for female and
mal e animal s was -0.81.
Us ing these data, the inverse demand functions for the milk, and female and male
animal s consumed were calculated as
D(MK,' ) = 53.226 - 0.004 MK',.
D(Xt' ) = 0.56 - 0.121 X,' W1.,
D(Y,') = 0.57 - 0.116 Y,'W,,,.
The herder is assum ed to be a price taker in milk, and female and male animals so ld .
Hence. th e demand for these products is hori zontal.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In this study, adetenninistic model that uses the average annual rainfall was developed
and used. Thi s deterministic model is one of maximizing net surplus evaluated at the mean .
The probl em wi th thi s approach is that the solution values of the control and state variables
obtained usi ng the net surplus maximization evaluated at the mean model are biased
compared to a model th at max imizes the expected net surplus.
To show the direct ion of the bias, two discrete time optimal control theorems, one with
uncertainty and one without uncertainty, were developed using simple problems. These
theorems are based on Bellman 's dynamic programming with backward recursion . A
comparison of the so lution va lues of the control and state variables suggested by these two
theorems showed that the sol ution values of the control and the state variables obtained
from the model without th e uncertainty were biased upwards and downwards, respectively
co mpared to the solu tion values of the same variables derived from the model with
uncert ai nty.
When the two scenarios were run, they generated time profiles of female cattle stock ,
fema le cattl e cons umed, female cattle sold, male cattle stock, male cattle sold, male cattle
consumed , herd size, milk production, forage stock, net surplus from milk, net surplus from
fem ales sold and consumed, and net surplus from males sold and consumed. The time
profiles are for the tim e horizon under consideration, which was to year 2000. Figures 1
through 12 show the time profiles of the variables mentioned above.
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The results indicate that unrestri cted access of the rangelands resulted in a smaller
stationary state herd size (Figure I) and forage stock (Figure 2) as compared to rangelands
with controlled usage. To explain these results let us study the time profiles of the herd
size and forage stock. Since the time profile of the herd size is the vertical summation of
the time profiles o f the femal e (Figure 3) and male stock (Figure 4) (herd size = number of
females plus number males), we will study the time profile of the herd size by studying its
components.
The time profiles of the number of female stock have the same pattern for both
scenarios (Figure 3). Both of the time profiles increased rapidly, then reached a maximum
after wh ich they declined moderately until they converged to an stationary state values in
the year II. After that, th ey both exhib it some fluctu ations . The fluctu ations are due to the
peri od ic droughts and th e d iscrete nature of the variable. The time profiles for the male
stock fo llow a similar pattern as that of the female stock for both scenarios (Figure 4) . The
reason fo r the initi al rap id increase of the fem ale and male stock sizes for both scenarios
is th at th e initi al stock levels were small for both females and males.
In the central region s of Somalia cattle are concentrated around the settlements where
there are bore holes for dai ly watering. Cattle graze < I 0- 15 km from th e water sources and
co nt ribute tremendously to the range degradation near water sources. Availability of water
is the major factor determining how long catt le remain in a g iven area. During the rainy
seasons, when th ere are surface waters, cattle graze farther away from the settlements.
However, after abo ut 2-3 weeks after the end of the rains, surface water dri es up, and the
herders have to move close to the semi-permanent or penn anent water sources. Thi s resu lts
in severe degradation in the area surrounding the settlements. Consequently, a small herd
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size per household could be sustained with the available forage around these settlements.
Thi s is why the initial herd si ze was small.
On the other hand , since most of the distant rangelands were not grazed most of the
year because of lack of water, the amount of forage stock is large and mainly not
suffi ciently exploited. In thi s model, it was assumed that cattle have access to one third of
th e range, which is the area surrounding the semi-permanent and permanent water
resources. Thi s assumption implies that watering points are well distributed throughout the
area that is access ible to cattle. Hence, there is enough forage to justify the initial herd si ze
increases.
This coul d be conceptualized that in the case of the private scenario, the manager will
increase the size of the female and male stock until the marginal benefit equals marginal
user cost (rememberthe marginal extraction cost was set to equal zero) . This could be seen
by rewriting eq uations (4 8) and (49).
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In eq uati on ( 14 1), the le ft -hand side is the present value of the marginal benefit of an
add it ional female and th e ri ght-hand side is the present value of the marginal user cost of
an additi onal female plu s the shadow value of female animal. The present value of the
marginal benefi t consi sts o f the present values of the additional milk for consumption or
sal e, the addit ional cow, and the additional offspring that the cow could produce. The
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present value of the marginal user cost consists of the present value of the forage cost
(value of the forage stock consumed by the additional cow that will not be available in the
future), and the present valu e of the weight lost from all other animals resulting from the
reducti o n in the amount of forage available per animal and the current value of the shadow
value of femal e animal s. Similarly, in equation ( 142), the left-hand side is the present value
of the marg inal benefit and the right-hand side is the present value of the marginal user cost
of an additional male. The present value of the marginal benefit from a male consists of
th e present value of the male animal only, whereas the present value of the marginal user
cost consi sts of the present value of the forage cost, and the present value of the weight lost
from all other animals resulting from the reduction in the amount of forage available per
animal plus the curren t value of the shadow value of the male animal. The optimal number
o f animal s (both femal es and males) will balance the present value of the marginal benefit
of grazing wi th th e prese nt value of the marginal cost of grazing plus the current value of
the shadow val ue o f th e mal e animal. At this level each herder wi ll receive a wealth equal
to its share of scarcity rent. Hence, the manager will not allow any herd size larger than
optim al for it \\"ill reduce hi s/her wealth .
The initial large amount of forage avai lable per animal coupled with the initial small
herd size

imrli~s

that forage stock is not initially binding. Consequently, the forage cost

aFc, · 1 ~, . )
..
.
.
( aFc,
o f th e additi o nal annna l grazed 10 the range - - ·1 ~, . 1 and - 1

ax,

ay,

.

IS

small and the

weight loss fno 111 .d I othe r animals in the range resulting from the reduction in forage by the
addi tional an nnal

~raz~d in the range ( awG'"'
"'•·• and a~G,. 1 "''"')
ax,
oy,

is zero. This means that the

margin al us.:r (OSt is initi all y small. However, the marginal benefit is relatively large.
Hence. a rat1on.d

h~rd er

will desire to increase the number of both females and males (that

64
is, herd size). This explains the initial rapid increase in herd size. However, as herd size
continues to increase so does the forage consumption and, therefore, forage cost until the
marginal benefit eq ual s marginal cost of grazing in which case the herd size converges to
a stationary state. Thi s level of herd size corresponds to where forage begins to become
binding and WG begins to respond to the increase in herd size. At this level of herd size,
each herder will receive a profit equal to its share of scarcity rent. Hence the manager will
not allow any herd size larger than optimal for it will reduce his or her profit.
When access to the resource is unrestricted, exclusivity is lost. As a result, it is rational
for the herder to ignore the asset value of the forage, since he/she can never appropriate it,
and simply maximizes the use value of it. When the herder ignores the shadow value of
the

forage,~,

and the effect hi s actions inflict on others ro (the weight lost from all other

animals resulting from the reduction in the amount of forage available per animal caused
by the additional animal grazed), the terms that

involv e~

and ro will drop from equations

( 141) and ( 142). Thus, the herder wi ll continue increasing his femal e and male stock as
long as the marginal benefits are positive. The level of herd size will be above the optimal
level because the marginal benefit wi ll continue to be positive even after the forage
becomes binding. Thi s level of herd size will result in overgrazing and equilibrium level
of fora ge wi ll decline. As this level of herd size is maintained, a new equilibrium leve l,
where fo rage demand eq uals forage productivity, is reached. This new steady-state level
is below that of the private.
The rapid increase in the female stock (Figure 3) is brought about by an initial increase
in the number older females and younger males sold. The revenues derived from these
sa les were used to purchase heifers to increase the breeding base of the herd . The increase

65
is al so partially from reproduction. This way the herder is ab le to build a larger sustainabl e
herd si ze. Now that the herder has a larger herd size and the birth and death rates remained
unchan ged, the numb er of the newborn animals will increase. Half of these is assumed to
be fema les and the other half is assumed to be males. This will account for the rapid
increase of both female and male stock. The stationary-state levels of female and male
stocks for the commons scenario are below that of the private scenario.
The time path s for the forage stock for both scenarios (Figure 2) were almost the
mirror image of that of the herd sizes. Initially the herd size is small and forage stock is
large. Then herd size increases and forage stock decreases until a stationary state is reached
in year II. The stat ionary-state forage stock was smaller for the commons scenario than
that of the private scenario.
For both scenarios, the tim e path for the females sold consists of two portions. The
first portion shows negative sa les (i.e., purchases) and in the second portion sales are
positi ve (Figure 5). For both scenarios, the purchases exhibited an initi a l increase followed
by a decline, whereas sa les increased until they converged into a stationary state in year II .
Th e initi al increase in femal e purchases was brought about by an initi a l increase in older
females and immature males sold. The revenue from these sales was used to purchase more
heifers. More fema les were purchased in the commons scenario, unt il stat ionary state is
reached , as compared to the private scenario. The stati onary state number of fema les so ld
was larger for the private sce nario than the commons scenario.
The decision of se llin g a cow is based on the equality of the marginal benefit and
marginal cost of selling a cow as is shown in equation (53) . Equation (53) indicates that
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the marginal benefit consists of the sale price of the cow, the val ue of the forage stock
preserved and wi ll be avai lab le for grazing by future generations, and the va lue of the
additional weight gained by the rest of the animals resulting from an increased amount of
forage available per anim al. The marginal costs consist of the value of milk that is
fo rego ne, future value of the cow sold, and the value of the offspring that it could produce
if it were kept in the herd. If the marginal benefit of selling a cow outweighs the marginal
user cost of selli ng a cow, th en the cow is so ld ; however, if the marginal benefit is less than
the marginal user cost, the cow is retained . A negative sales indicates a purchase. The
initial large amount of forage available per animal will reduce the value of the forage stock
preserved and the val ue of the additional weight gained by the rest of the animals because
forage constraint is not binding at thi s stage. However, the marginal cost of selling a
fema le remains unchanged. Consequently, it benefit s the herder to purchase a cow. Thi s
ex plain s the initial increase in female purchases.
Th e time paths for the females slaughtered for household consumption followed the
same pattern for both scenarios (Fi gure 6).

They both increased rapidly until they

con,·erged to a stationary state in year II . Equation (55) shows the bas is for the decisions
concerning whether to kill a cow for household consumption or not. This decision is based
on the equali ty of marginal benefit and marginal cost of killing an animal for household
co nsumption . As in equation (53), the marginal benefit consists of the sale price of the
cow, the va lue of the forage stock preserved and will be available for grazing by future
generations, and the value of the addi tional weight gained by the rest of the animals
resulting from an increased amount of fo rage available per animal. The marginal costs
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consist of the val ue of milk that is foregone, future value of the cow consumed, and the
value of the offspring that it co•Jid produce if it were kept in the herd. If the marginal cost
of killing the animal for household is greater (less) than the marginal cost of killing the
animal for household consumption, then the cow is killed (kept in the herd).
The time paths for the males sold initially rose rapidly, then declined moderately, for
both scenarios, until a stationary state was reached (Figure 7). The initial rapid increase
was a result of more immature males sold , the proceedings of which were used to purchase
more heifers. The number of males sold was initially larger for the commons scenario than
for the private scenario until stationary state is reached, after which the reverse is true.
Equation (59) shows that the marginal benefi ts of selling a male animal are the market
va lu e of the male that cou ld be invested to purchase heifers, the value of the forage
preserved for future use, and the additional weight gain of the rest of the animals in the
range. The marginal user cost is the value of the animal that could be obtained sometime
in the future. The initial large an10unt of forage availability makes the marginal benefit
larger than the marginal user cost, explaining the initial rapid increase in males sold.
However, as time progresses, increased grazing pressure from the increased herd size will
reduce the amount of forage availab le, forcing the herd size and the males sold to decline
until a stat ionary state is reached in year II.
The time profile for the males consumed followed the same pattern as that of males
so ld for both scenarios (Figure 8).

Equation (57) show the basis for the decisions

co ncerning whether to slaughter a male animal or not. It can be interpreted as equation
(59).
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The time paths for milk production for both scenarios (Figure 9) have the same pattern
as th at of th e fema le stock for both scenarios. This is because the amount of milk produced
is determined by multiplying female stock by the average milk production and average
birth rJte, which are both assumed to be constants (equation ( 1)). Therefore, the time path
for milk production is the same as the time path of the fema le stock scaled vertically by the
product of the average milk production and average birth rate.
The patterns of the time paths for the net surp luses for the milk (Figure 10), fema les
sold (Figure II), and males sold (Figure 12) for both scenarios are the same as the time
paths from the milk, fem ales so ld, and males sold scaled up by multiplying by their
respective prices and adding by the demand for milk, female consumption, and male
co nsumption, respectivel y. Init iall y, before the stat ionary state is reached , the net surplu s
for the milk , females, and males was larger for the commons scenario than the private
scenario. However. as the stationary state is reached, the reverse becomes true.
The prese nt va lue of th e sum of the above-mentioned net surp luses measured in Soma li
Shillin gs (So . Sh.) was hi gher in the private scenario (So. Sh. 247,189,039) than in the
common scenario (So. Sh . 20 I ,408 ,687).
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

An expected net surplus maximization model was developed and its first-order
conditi ons are stated. However, this problem is very complicated and difficult to so lve.
Therefore, a deterministic model that uses the average annual rainfall was developed and
used for this st udy. Thi s deterministic model is one of maximizing net surplus evaluated
at the mean . The problem with this approach is that the sol ution va lues of the control and
state variables obta ined using the net surplus maximi zation evaluated at the mean model
are biased.
A comparison of two discrete time optimal control models, one with uncertainty and
one without uncertainty. that were developed using simple problems showed that the
so lu tion val ues of the control and state variables suggested by the model without the
uncertainty were biased upwards and downwards, respectively. That is, the solution values
of the control varia bl es and the state variab les were higher/lower in the model without
uncertainty than in the model with uncertainty, respectively.
Th e result > of this study indicate that unrestricted access of the rangelands resulted in
a smaller stati o nary-state he rd size and forage stock as compared to rangelands with
co nt rolled

usa ~ ~

For both scenarios the time profile of the herd size initially increased

rapi dl y, reachnl ~· m~tx imum when forage stock became binding, and then gradually
declined until
herd si ze \\·as

II

ron \crgcd to an oscillatory stationary state. The initi al rapid increase of

h~ctusc

forage stock was not initially binding. However, the time profile of
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the herd size in th e communally owned rangelands reached a higher maximum due to the
fact that the herder ignored the shadow value of the forage . The maximum herd size for
private ownership was reached when forage started to become binding, whereas the
maxi mum herd size for the communal ownership was reached much later. This caused
overgrazing of th e communally owned rangelands, wh ich resulted in a lower steady-state
forage stock and herd size. The time profiles for herd size and forage stock were mirror
images of each other.
The time profiles for the female stock, male stock, males sold, males consumed, milk
production, net su rplus from milk sold and consumed, and net surplus from the males sold
and consumed all have very similar patterns for both scenarios. They all increased rapidly,
then reached a max imum, after which they declined moderately until they converged to a
stati onary state value. The time profiles for the females sold, females consumed, and net
surplu s from fema les sold and consumed all followed the same pattern for the two
scenarios. They all increased until they converged to an oscillatory stationary state.
This study developed a basic model to determine the optimal cattle herd size for
rangeland s wit h unregulated private exploitation and rangelands with unified control.
However, thi s basic model can be improved by expanding it to include all livestock classes,
cattl e, came ls, goats, and sheep. The model could also be improved by treating rainfall as
a random variab le instead of using its mean value.
This model assumed an even di stribution of watering points throughout the accessibl e
ran ge . Th is increased the initial forage stock. However, the distribution is poor and part
of th e accessible range is exp loited only a few weeks during the rainy season before the
surface water dri es up. Therefore, improving water distribution by developing more
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watering points would improve the rangeland by promoting an even exploitation of the
rangelands.
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